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Abstract
We introduce incomplete outsourcing contracts in an otherwise stan-
dard model of MNEs based on the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e np r o x i m i t ya n dc o n -
centration. This has both positive and normative implications. As to the
former, incomplete outsourcing contracts can account for the observed
emergence of FDIs in large markets not only when trade costs are large
but also when trade costs are small. As to the latter implications, con-
tractual incompleteness alters someway dramatically the choice of supply
mode made when contracts are complete.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We investigate how distance interacts with market size in determining foreign
ﬁrms’ choices to serve a local market through exports or FDI. In so doing,
we modify an otherwise standard proximity-vs-concentration model of multina-
tionals (see, e.g., Markusen, 1995) to allow for incomplete outsourcing contracts.
All the rest given, contractual incompleteness aﬀects someway dramatically the
costs and beneﬁts of the alternative supply modes. In particular, depending
on market size, contractual incompleteness generates a non-linear relation be-
tween distance and FDI: for large host markets the share of foreign ﬁrms that
choose FDI over export is the smallest at intermediate distance from the source
country.
This result matches the stylized facts reported in Table 1. The table shows
the average ratio of FDI inward stocks over trade for diﬀerent country groups,
classiﬁed according to the size of their market (GDP) as well as their distance
from the countries that are the major sources of FDI ﬂows.1 For countries
with small markets there is a clear positive association of FDI/trade ratios with
peripherality. For countries with large markets FDI/trade ratios tend to be
higher in central and peripheral regions, and lower in semi-central and semi-
peripheral countries. This pattern turns out to be fairly robust with respect to
the chosen classiﬁcation of countries according to economic distance.
Market size Central Semi-central Semi-periph. Periph.
Small N. obs. 1 6 16 45
FDI/trade 0.02 0.1 0.27 0.27
Large N. obs. 21 22 27 6
FDI/Trade 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.23
Table 1 - Average FDI-trade ratios in diﬀerent country groups, 1995
1FDI-trade ratios for each country are obtained dividing the value of FDI inﬂow stock
(source: UNCTAD, 2001) by the value of total trade (imports(cif)+exports(fob), source:
World Bank, 2001), both in current 1995 dollars. A better measure for FDI activity would
be aﬃliates’ sales, but these data are available only for a limited number of source countries.
On average, aﬃliates’ sales in a given country are between 2 and 3 times higher than the
corresponding FDI stock and there is a quite strong correlation both across countries (see,
e.g., Shatz and Venables, 2001) and in time series (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 2001). Countries
with large (small) markets are deﬁned as those with GDP (at 1995 US dollars, source: World
Bank, 2001) above (below) the median. Central countries: NAFTA, EU and EFTA countries,
Japan and China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong, province of China). Peripheral countries:
Sub-Saharan Africa (except for South Africa and Mauritius); Central Asia, Myanmar, Laos,
Nepal and Mongolia; Haiti, Paciﬁc Island states. Semi-central countries: Australia; Rest
of Europe (except former USSR states and including Cyprus); Argentina, Brazil and Chile;
Turkey, India, South Korea, Thailand, Malesia, Singapore; Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel.
Semi-peripheral countries: Russian Federation and former USSR states; West Asia (except
Turkey), Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia; Rest
of Central and South America; Algeria, South Africa and Mauritius; New Zealand and Papua
New Guinea.
2In our model the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is somehow
blurred, as it is often in reality.2 The production process consists of two activi-
ties: an ‘upstream’ activity that we interpret as the production of intermediate
inputs, and a ‘downstream’ activity that we interpret as assembly (or commer-
cialization). To keep the model as simple as possible, we focus on a local market
where the ﬁnal product is supplied only by foreign ﬁrms. These ﬁrms choose
their supply mode between exports and FDI. This latter option, however, is
available only in the downstream stage. This assumption is supported by em-
pirical evidence. For instance, the share of value added on sales for US foreign
aﬃliates is lower compared with domestically owned establishments based in
the US, which means that only a subset of production stages are performed in
foreign subsidiaries (see Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2001). So, in spite of
the fact that FDI in our model is carried out with the aim of serving the local
market (as it is typical of horizontal FDIs), FDI activity is associated with the
geographical separation of production stages (as it is typical for vertical FDIs).
As implied by the proximity-vs-concentration framework, the choice of sup-
ply mode entails a trade-oﬀ. E x p o r t a t i o nf a c e st r a d ec o s t sb u ts a v e so nt h e
additional costs of distant operations, while the opposite is true for FDI. In
particular, we assume that carrying out FDI requires a local investment in as-
sembly lines. The larger the investment, the lower the variable costs but the
higher the plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs. A ﬁrm that undertakes such investment
is a multinational enterprise (henceforth, MNE) and faces a choice in terms of
intermediate supply. The MNE can produce its intermediates in its country of
origin and then ship them to the assembly lines. Alternatively, it can outsource
their porduction to local suppliers.3 Therefore, FDI always concerns a subset
of activities, but these may or may not entail intra-ﬁrm trade depending on
whether self-production or outsourcing are chosen.
The choice between self-production and outsourcing of intermediates intro-
duces a second trade-oﬀ. Self-production incurs in trade costs because interme-
diates have to be shipped to the distant assembly line. Outsourcing saves on
trade costs but faces additional costs on its own. We focus on the transaction
costs associated with the outsourcing agreement between the MNEs and their
local suppliers.4 Speciﬁcally, we follow Grossman and Helpman (2002a, 2002b)
2Recent evidence shows that the benchmark distinction between horizontal and vertical
FDI does not capture the growing importance of MNEs’ expansion strategies which involve
FDIs having both horizontal and vertical features (see Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2001).
3See, e.g., Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (2001) for empirical evidence on the growing impor-
tance of within-sector trade in intermediate inputs. Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001)
report that the share of input purchases over sales for US foreign aﬃliates in 1994 is 12 per
cent for manufacturing as a whole, with shares over 20 per cent in electronics and transport
equipment.
4Transaction costs are at the centre of the theory of the ﬁrm since the pioneering work
of Coase (1937). Williamson (1985) revived the insights of Coase relating the eﬃcient de-
termination of ﬁrms’ boundaries to investment incentives in the presence of asset speciﬁcity
and incomplete contracting. The ﬁrst formalization of the hold-up problem in the presence of
asset speciﬁcity and incomplete contracting is found in Grout (1984). Hart and Moore (1990)
study the implications of alternative ownership structures on investment incentives within the
ﬁrm.
3and assume that the local input suppliers may ﬁnd themselves held-up with the
agreement due to contractual incompleteness and ex-post bargaining. The idea
is that, if contracts cannot be written ex-ante due to unforeseeable contingen-
cies and if the intermediate inputs requested are speciﬁc (i.e., of scarce alterna-
tive uses outside the MNE-supplier relationship), then the local subcontractor
may end up underproducing the input, anticipating less than full reward for its
services. Moreover, since also MNEs have to undertake relation-speciﬁci n v e s t -
ments in an incomplete-contract environment, a double-sided hold-up problem
arises. However, as opposed to input suppliers, MNEs have an outside option
when engaging in outsourcing arrangements: they can fall back on intermediate
self-production and exportation.
The role of the outside option in the ex-post bargaining process is at the
source of the non-linearity between FDI and trade costs. It makes the payoﬀ
from FDI plus outsourcing depend on trade costs even though no trade takes
place under that supply mode. To understand why this happens, consider again
the trade-oﬀsaﬁrm faces when choosing its supply mode. First, it faces the
traditional proximity-vs-concentration trade-oﬀ. Second, in the case of FDI, it
faces the trade-oﬀ between outsourcing and intermediate exports. This second
trade-oﬀ is entirely due to the contractual incompleteness and arises only if the
ex-post bargaining power of the ﬁr mi ss m a l le n o u g hw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ec o s to f
shipping intermediates.
Crucially, the level of trade costs aﬀects both trade-oﬀs. When trade costs
are large, the ﬁrst trade-oﬀ dominates and makes FDI more appealing than ex-
ports due to traditional proximity considerations. When trade costs are small,
the second trade-oﬀ dominates. It is still true that small trade costs make
exports more appealing than FDI due to proximity-vs-concentration considera-
tions. However, they also strengthen the outside option of FDI plus intermediate
exports. This ‘outside option eﬀect’ increases the MNE’s payoﬀ from ex-post
bargaining and therefore, it makes outsourcing more attractive. If market size
is large enough such an outside option eﬀect may prevail. This explains the
non-monotonic relation between FDI and distance only in countries with large
markets as reported in Table 1. Since the outside-option eﬀect is entirely due to
the hold-up problem, non-monotonicity disappears under contract completeness.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section
we put our contribution into context by surveying some related literature. In
Section 3 we present the structure of the model. In section 4 ﬁrms’ equilibrium
proﬁts are computed under the alternative modes of serving the foreign mar-
ket: ﬁnal export, FDI plus intermediate export, and FDI plus outsourcing. In
section 5 we characterize the equilibrium of the model. In Section 6 we pro-
vide comparative statics results and solve the model under complete contracts.
Section 7 concludes.
42 Related literature
The role of both distance and size has been extensively investigated in the
empirical literature on multinationals (henceforth, MNEs). A positive relation
is found between market size and FDI inﬂows. Wheeler and Mody (1992),
for instance, show that capital expenditures by US MNEs in a given market
increase more than proportionally with market size. Furthermore, FDI ﬂows
are more intense among countries with similar market sizes (Markusen and
Maskus, 1999; Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2000). As to the empirical relation
between economic distance and FDI ﬂows, the picture is somehow less clear-
cut. A ﬁrst approach is to relate measures of FDI (stocks or ﬂows) to measures
of economic distance between source and host countries. As reported in Shatz
and Venables (2001), controlling for market size, FDIs from most major sources
(US, EU and Japan) tend to fall with the distance to the host country, as
in gravity-type empirical analyses of trade volumes.5 However, this approach
cannot help to understand whether FDI becomes more or less likely than trade
in serving foreign markets as economic distance rises. Brainard (1997) analyses
at the sectoral level the share of exports over total US sales (including also US
aﬃliate sales) in each foreign market. Trade costs are found to aﬀect positively
this measure of FDI activity versus trade. A ﬁrm-level analysis on Swedish
MNEs with a similar aim is found Ekholm (1998), who investigates ﬁrst the
decision to serve a foreign market via exports or via FDI, and subsequently
the pattern of Swedish exports over total Swedish sales. In her results distance
is negatively related to the decision to undertake FDI in a given market, but,
once the decision is taken, the share of aﬃliates sales on total Swedish sales
rises with distance, as found in Brainard (1997). These contributions focus on
horizontal FDIs. Other studies are targeted to international investments of a
vertical type. Shatz (1999) considers exports of aﬃl i a t e so fU SM N E sl o c a t e d
in diﬀerent developing countries. He ﬁnds a positive relation between exports
directed to the US and measures of transport costs and trade openness.
As to the non-monotonic relation between FDI and distance for large mar-
kets reported in Figure 1, the existing literature suggests possible explanations
that rely on the complex interplay between trade and transport costs, market
size, factor endowments and the extent and composition of FDI (horizontal vs
vertical). In particular, the theory of MNEs points out that the relation between
the likelihood of FDI and distance depends crucially on the type of FDI consid-
ered. Horizontal FDIs, aimed at selling in the local market are more likely the
higher transport costs are (see, e.g., Horstmann and Markusen, 1987; Brainard,
1993; Markusen and Venables, 1998). When FDI is vertical (Helpman, 1984),
aimed at saving on costs in a particular production stage, it is instead more
likely directed towards relatively close markets. The reason is that in this case
FDI is not a substitute for trade, but rather a complement, since trade ﬂows will
occur intra-ﬁrm, and economic distance adds costs to the MNE. As illustrated
5A negative sign for distance (and a positive one for trade barriers in host countries) is also
found in Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2000) that analyse the determinants of US aﬃliates’
sales.
5in Markusen and Maskus (2001) in general equilibrium models comprising both
horizontal and vertical FDIs, when trade costs fall FDI between a given pair of
countries may either rise or fall depending on countries’ characteristics. In this
paper we propose a model that provides an alternative explanation based on
the incompleteness of outsourcing contracts.
3 The Model
Consider a country M endowed with L units of labour supplied inelastically by
L identical workers. Workers share the same preferences deﬁned over a unit-









where y(i) is the consumption of variety i of good Y and z is the consumption






where A is a measure of the local “market potential”, which is increasing in the
size of the market (L) and in the price of competing varieties.
Good Z is produced under perfect competition using one unit of labour per
unit of output. This good is freely traded on international markets and it is
chosen as numeraire. Due to marginal cost pricing, this implies that also the
equilibrium wage equals unity. Good Y is produced under monopolistic com-
petition using a proportional amount of an intermediate good X per unit of
output. There is a one-to-one relation between varieties and ﬁrms. Intermedi-
ates are variety-speciﬁc and one unit of intermediate is produced by one unit of
labor.
In sector Y all ﬁrms are foreign-owned and supply the local market under
three alternative modes. Under the ﬁnal export mode (henceforth, mode X),
intermediate and ﬁnal productions take place abroad and the ﬁnal output is
shipped to M. In this case the production of y(i) units of variety i requires an
equal amount of units of a variety-speciﬁc intermediate input x(i). Shipments
face iceberg trade costs: for each unit shipped only a fraction τ ∈ (0,1) reaches
its ﬁnal destination.
Under the intermediate export mode (henceforth, mode E), intermediates
are produced abroad and then shipped to country M where ﬁnal production
takes place. For simplicity, we assume that intermediates incur the same trade
cost τ as the ﬁnal products. In this case, the production of y(i) units of variety
i requires spending an amount I(i)2 of the numeraire in market M where I(i)
represents the amount of investment (FDI) in assembly. Such investment is
6speciﬁct oc o u n t r yM and to variety i and aﬀects the variable costs of assembly.
In particular, we assume that the marginal cost of assembling one unit of input
x(i) into one unit of output y is 1/I(i). Accordingly, in choosing I(i), Y -ﬁrms
face a trade-oﬀ between the ﬁxed cost I(i)2 and the variable cost 1/I(i).
Under the outsourcing mode (henceforth, O), also intermediates are pro-
d u c e di nc o u n t r yM. In this case, all technological conditions are the same as
in mode E. However, local intermediate production requires ﬁrms to contract
with local intermediate producers. Due to unforeseen contingencies, complete
contracts cannot be written. Therefore, the surplus from the outsourcing agree-
ment can be shared only after the delivery of the speciﬁc input on the basis of
the barganing power of the two parties. The share of ex-post surplus appropri-
ated by the local intermediate supplier is denoted by β, β ∈ [0,1].T h es u r p l u s
from the outsourcing agreement accruing to each party is given by the revenue
generated by the ﬁnal sales minus the value of each parties’ outside options.
For the intermediate suppliers no outside option is available, since the input
characteristics are speciﬁct ot h eﬁnal producer (i.e., once produced for the ﬁrm
i, intermediates are useless to any other Y -ﬁrm). On the contrary, as an outside
option, the Y -ﬁrm can produce the intermediate input by itself abroad and ship
it to M for ﬁnal transformation as under mode E. The timing of events is as
follows. First, the ﬁrm i chooses the level of investment I(i) in local trans-
formation. Then, the local intermediate supplier chooses the amount of input
x(i) to supply. The chosen sequence reﬂects a higher degree of irreversibility of
assembly investment I(i).6
To sum up, the sequence of actions for the whole game is described in Figure
1. In the ﬁrst stage, Y -ﬁrms choose between modes X, E and O.I f X is
chosen, then the ﬁrm sets the level of production that maximizes proﬁts. If E
is chosen, there is a second stage in which the ﬁrm makes a decision about the
investment I in the trasformation technology. Finally, if O is chosen, there are
two additional stages. In the third the input supplier chooses the amount of
input to produce. In the fourth there is bargaining over the surplus from the
outsourcing agreement.
To ease notation, exploiting the symmetry across ﬁrms in terms of prefer-
ences and production technologies, the variety index i will henceforth be omit-
ted. The only index used will denote the alternative chosen by MNEs to serve
market M (i.e., X, E,o rO).
4P a y o ﬀs under alternative supply modes
An equilibrium is deﬁn e da sas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hﬁrms maximize proﬁts, con-
sumers maximize utility, and markets clear. In particular, it has to be true
that, given the choices of all other Y -ﬁrms, each Y -ﬁrm serves market M in
its preferred way, achieving a proﬁt-maximizing scale of production for ﬁnal as
6Were the Y -ﬁrm and the intermediate supplier to choose simultaneously rather than
sequentially, the main results of the model would be unaﬀected (no multiple equilibria, non-
linear relation between outsourcing and transport costs).
7well as intermediate goods and making a proﬁt-maximizing investment. To ﬁnd
such equilibrium we solve the model backwards. Each Y -ﬁrm chooses among
the diﬀerent modes by computing the corresponding payoﬀs backwards given
an expectation on the choices made by all other Y -ﬁrms. These choices are
summarized by a certain value for the market potential A:
A(m,n)=
L
n/po + m/pE +( 1− m − n)/px
(3)
where m and n are the numbers of ﬁrms adopting modes O and E respectively.
Therefore, the conjectures made by ﬁrms are expectations on the market po-
tential variable A.G i v e nA, investments, prices and quantities of ﬁnal outputs
and intermediate inputs can be readily obtained.
4.1 Final exports
When a Y -ﬁrm decides to serve the market through the export of the ﬁnal good
(mode X), intermediate production and transformation are both performed
abroad. Recall that in this case the intermediate input transforms one-to-one
into ﬁnal output. Moreover, due to iceberg trade costs, an amount x of inter-
mediate input satisﬁes a ﬁnal demand equal to xτ. The problem of the Y -ﬁrm




Aτx − x, (4)
where π and Π denote operating and total proﬁts respectively. The proﬁtm a x -





The corresponding price can be obtained by substituting (5) into the inverse
demand function p =( A/y)
1





while the associated proﬁts are:




As it is intuitive, these results show that, under the ﬁnal export mode,
outputs and proﬁts fall while prices rise as trade costs increase (τ decreases)
and the market potential rises.
84.2 FDI plus intermediate exports
Under mode E,t h eY -ﬁrm manufactures inputs abroad and ships them to M
for ﬁnal transformation. FDI therefore takes place and the MNE has ﬁrst to
decide on the level of investment I a n dt h e no nt h el e v e lo fo u t p u tx.S o l v i n g




AτxI − x (8)










with associated operating proﬁts given by:




In choosing I the Y -ﬁrm solves:
max
I
ΠE(I)=πE(I) − I2, (12)
















As under mode X, under the intermediate export mode E,o u t p u t sa n d
proﬁts fall while prices rise as trade costs increase (τ decreases) and the market
potential rises. However, ﬁrms’ total proﬁts fall with the square of transport
costs. This is explained by the fact that higher trade costs and lower market
potential reduce both operating proﬁts at given I and ﬁrms’ desired investment
(see (13)).
94.3 FDI plus outsourcing
Under the outsourcing mode O,e a c hY -ﬁrm performs ﬁnal production in coun-
try M (hence it is an MNE) relying on a speciﬁc local intermediate supplier
under incomplete contracts. The timing of events is such that ﬁrst the Y -ﬁrm
chooses its level of investment I, then the supplier chooses its output and ﬁnally
the surplus from the outsourcing agreement is split between the two parties.
Solving backwards, we start with the bargaining stage. Contractual incom-
pleteness implies that the surplus of the match is distributed between the Y -ﬁrm
and its supplier through ex-post bargaining. Speciﬁcally, the MNE and the in-




(R − RMNE)β (RMNE − πE)
(1−β) , (16)
where β denotes the barganing power of the input supplier, and RMNE the
amount of revenues captured by the MNE. Moreover, πE is the value of the
MNE’s outside option, i.e., the operating proﬁt it would earn by importing
rather than outsourcing the intermediate input. Due to the speciﬁcity of its in-
put, the outside option of the supplier is instead zero. Thus, for the outsourcing
agreement to be considered at all by the two parties, the associated revenues
R cannot be lower than their outside options. Since the outside options are
zero for the supplier and πE for the MNE, for the outsourcing agreement to
be considered at all the associated revenues must be higher than the operating
proﬁts under intermediate exports:
R>πE (17)
Denoting by RS the amount of revenues accruing to the input supplier, the
solution of (16) yields
RSupp = β (R − πE), (18)
RMNE =( 1 − β)(R − πE)+πE. (19)
The parties share the surplus from the agreement (i.e., revenues net of the
sum of parties’ outside options where the supplier has no outside option) ac-
cording to their bargaining powers. For each party the share of surplus is added
to the outside option. The expressions for RSupp and RMNE in (18) and (19)
represent the payoﬀs of the input supplier and the MNE respectively from in-
vesting in the outsourcing relationship. In the case of the input supplier the
investment consists of the production of an amount x of speciﬁc input. In the
case of the Y -ﬁrm the investment is an amount I of numeraire in assembly.
Of course, the stronger the bargaining power of the supplier β,t h el a r g e rt h e
weight of the outside option in the revenues accruing to the MNE.
Solving backwards, recalling that y = xI and using the inverse demand




AxI − πE(I)) − x. (20)
Note that, due to the timing of events, in problem (20) the term πE(I) is treated
as exogenous. The necessary condition for this maximization problem generates










gives total revenues as a function of the investment I: RO(I)=pO(I)xO(I)I.
The Y -ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts with respect to I taking into account the best
reply of the intermediate supplier and the eﬀe c tt h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n th a so ni t s
own outside option, πE(I). The problem for the Y -ﬁrm is therefore
max
I
ΠO(I)=( 1− β) RO(I)+βπ E(I) − I2 (23)



























Proﬁts (26) are concave in β and reach a maximum at β =( 2+τ)/4.F o r
given A, this would be the allocation of bargaining powers between parties that
maximizes the MNE’s payoﬀ by striking the right balance between its incentive
to invest and the supplier’s incentive to produce. Proﬁts are always positive,
are equal to zero at β =0and equal to ΠE at β =1 . In the former case,
the intermediate supplier has no incentive to produce. In the latter, the MNE
has no claim on the surplus from outsourcing and thus falls back on its outside
option.
Finally, given (17), for the outsourcing agreement to be considered at all by





11Whenever (27) is violated, the outside option of the MNE dominates its out-
sourcing payoﬀ. This occurs when trade costs are small (τ large) and the bar-
gaining power of the MNE is weak (β large). Intuitively, outsourcing is un-
appealing with respect to intermediate export when exporting intermediates is
cheap and when the hold-up problem for the supplier is big (since in such a case
intermediate production is small).
5 Choice of supply mode
In this section we determine the number of Y -ﬁrms that choose modes X, E,
or O in equilibrium. We start with considering a situation in which no ﬁrm will
ever choose mode O. This is the case when (27) is violated. The opposite case
is addressed next.
5.1 Case 1: Intermediate exports dominate outsourcing
When (27) does not hold, mode O is dominated by mode E. Recalling that
m and n are the numbers of ﬁrms adopting modes E and O respectively, the
violation of (27) implies n =0f o ra l lp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .T h e n(m,n)=( m∗,0)
is an equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms between modes E and X whenever no
ﬁrm wants to change its mode. This happens for interior outcomes m ∈ (0,1)
whenever:







and for corner outcomes m =1(m =0 ) whenever ∆X,E(m) < 0 (> 0). In (28)
the market potential measure is obtained by solving (3) after substituting for
the equilibrium prices (6) and (14):
A(m,0) = 4
p
(1 − 2m + m2 + mL) − (1 − m)
τm
. (29)





which can be shown to be a stable equilibrium since ∂∆X,E/∂m|m=m∗ > 0.
When L>16 (L<8)a l lﬁrms choose mode E (X), that is, m =1(m =0 ).
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 1 When β < τ/2 FDI plus outsourcing (mode O) is never chosen.
T h ec h o i c eb e t w e e nﬁnal exports (mode X) and FDI plus intermediate exports
(mode E)i su n a ﬀected by trade costs and depends only on market size. In
particular, the share of ﬁrms choosing FDI increases with market size.
Trade costs are immaterial for the ch o i c eo fm o d eb e c a u s et h e i rc h a n g e s
aﬀect modes X and E i nt h es a m ew a y .
125.2 Case 2: Outsourcing dominates intermediate exports
When (27) holds there is a potential gain for the MNE from signing an outsourc-
ing agreement. Therefore, in principle all three modes are viable options for a
Y -ﬁrm to serve market M. However, by (15) and (26), it is readily shown that
ΠO > ΠE whenever (27) is satisﬁed. Thus, as before, only two modes are rele-
vant. These modes are X and O, which implies m =0 .T h e n(m,n)=( 0 ,n ∗)
is an equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms between modes X and O whenever no
ﬁrm wants to change its mode. This happens for interior outcomes n ∈ (0,1)
whenever:













and for corner outcomes n =1(n =0 ) whenever ∆X,O(n) < 0 (> 0). In (31)
the market potential measure is obtained by solving (3) after substituting for





2 (τ +2 ( 1− β)) + τ2 (1 − n)
2
2nβ
2 (τ +2 ( 1− β))
. (32)




[τ +2 ( 1− β)]
β
2[τ +2 ( 1− β)]2L − 8τ2
τ2 (2β − τ)
. (33)
which can be shown to be a stable equilibrium since ∂∆X,O/∂n|n=n∗ > 0.G i v e n










where LO >L X is granted once more by (27). Corner outcomes n =0and
n =1are attained for LX ≥ L and L ≥ LO respectively. It is readily veriﬁed
that LX is an increasing function of τ while LO is decreasing in τ whenever
τ > 4(1− β) (35)
holds and increasing otherwise. Note that, for (35) to hold at some τ < 1,i t
must be β > 3/4.
Thus, when β > τ/2 the chosen mode of supply depends on both the size
of the market and the level of trade costs. In particular, by simple inspection,
(33) shows that the share of ﬁrms choosing mode O always rises with market
size L (∂n∗/∂L>0). The impact of trade costs on n∗ is more complex. Indeed,





2[2(1 − β)+τ]2[(3 − 2β)τ − 4β(1 − β)]L − 8τ3
4τ3 (τ − 2β)
2 , (36)




2[2(1 − β)+τ]2[(3 − 2β)τ − 4β(1 − β)]
. (37)
Under (27) e L is a decreasing function of τ that falls between LX and LO as long
as (35) holds. Thus, when L ∈ (LX,L O) and (35) holds, we have ∂n∗/∂τ > 0
(∂n∗/∂τ < 0)f o rL>e L (L<e L). Moreover, since e L is decreasing in τ,w ec a n
have L>e L (L<e L) for large (small) τ and L>e L for large τ. This happens
if L is large enough, namely, larger than the smallest possible value of e L (i.e.,
e L|τ=1).
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 2 When β > τ/2 FDI plus intermediate exports (mode E)i s
never chosen. The choice between ﬁnal exports (mode X)a n dF D Ip l u so u s o u r c -
ing (mode O)i sa ﬀected by both market size and trade costs. In particular, the
share of ﬁrms choosing FDI increases with market size. It also increases with
trade costs if market size is small. On the contrary, the relation between the
share of ﬁrms chosing FDI and trade costs is U-shaped if market size is large
enough.
The source of this non-linearity lies in contractual incompleteness. This
makes the payoﬀ from mode O depend on trade costs even though no trade
takes place under that mode. To understand why this happens, consider the
trade-oﬀsaY -ﬁrm faces when choosing its supply mode. First, it faces the
traditional proximity-vs-concentration trade-oﬀ: ﬁnal exports incur trade costs
but save on the costs of distant assembly lines whereas the opposite is true for
FDI. Second, in the case of FDI, a Y -ﬁrm faces the trade-oﬀ between outsourcing
and intermediate exports. Outsourcing saves on trade costs but incurs the costs
of ex-post bargaining. FDI under intermediate exports incurs the former costs
but saves on the latter. This second trade-oﬀ is entirely due to contractual
incompleteness and arises only if the ex-post bargaining power of the Y -ﬁrm in
small enough with respect to the cost of shipping intermediates (β > τ/2).7
Crucially, the level of trade costs aﬀects both trade-oﬀs. When trade costs
are large, the ﬁrst trade-oﬀ dominates and makes FDI more appealing than ex-
ports due to traditional proximity considerations. When trade costs are small,
the second trade-oﬀ dominates. It is still true that small trade costs make
exports more appealing than FDI due to proximity-vs-concentration considera-
tions. However, they also strengthen the outside option of FDI plus intermediate
7This is formally shown in the next section, where the complete contract outcome is fully
characterized.
14exports. This outside-option eﬀect increases the Y -ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from ex-post
bargaining and therefore makes outsourcing more attractive. The more so the
larger the market size.
6O v e r v i e w o f r e s u l t s
In this section we discuss our ﬁndings. We start with a graphical presentation
of comparative statics results. Then, we characterize the complete contract
environment to highlight the impact of contractual incompleteness on the choice
of supply mode.
6.1 Comparative statics
Three scenarios can be distinguished depending on the values of β. Figure 2.a
characterizes the equilibrium conﬁgurations in the (L,τ) space for 0 < β < 1/2
so that all supply modes can arise depending on market size and trade costs. For
τ > 2β the ﬁgure portrays Case 1, in which mode O is always dominated for any
L and the choice between X and E is determined by market size considerations
only. For τ < 2β the ﬁgure depicts Case 2, in which mode O may dominate.
In this case, outsourcing is more likely to emerge as the equilibrium mode the
l a r g e rt h em a r k e ts i z ea n dt h eh i g h e rt h et r a d ec o s t s .
Figure 2.b characterizes the equilibrium conﬁgurations for 1/2 < β < 3/4
so that only Case 2 arises. In this case mode E is always dominated and, since
condition (35) is violated, the attractiveness of mode O with respect to mode
X increases not only with market size but also with trade costs.
Figure 2.c illustrates the situation for 3/4 < β < 1. Case 2 is still the
relevant one but now condition (35) can be satisﬁed. For τ < 4(1−β) the ﬁgure
is qualitatively the same as Figure 2.b: mode O is more appealing the larger
t h em a r k e ts i z ea n dt h et r a d ec o s t s . H o w e v e r ,f o rτ > 4(1 − β) the appeal of
outsourcing may exhibit a non-monotonic behaviour with respect to trade costs.
In particular, when market size is large enough (but smaller than LO), as τ rises
from 4(1−β) towards 1,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms choosing mode O ﬁrst falls and then
rises.
This non-monotonic behavior is due to the outside-option eﬀect, which can
prevail only when market size and the bargaining power of the local input sup-
pliers are suﬃciently large. A large market size is required because Y -ﬁrm
investments are proportional to the size of the market, so that the outside op-
tion eﬀect is also stronger the larger is the M market. A strong bargaining
power for suppliers is required because the surplus from the outsourcing agree-
ment is lower the greater the hold-up problem for the input supplier. Moreover,
the outside option eﬀect dominates only when trade costs are relatively small.
This can be understood by noting that the payoﬀso ft h eY -ﬁrm in both the
alternatives of export and outsourcing are continuous in the level of trade costs
and that prohibitive trade costs will leave the Y -ﬁrm with the only alternative
of outsourcing. So, increasing trade costs when they are already high will nec-
15essarily make FDI more likely. An opposite eﬀect can only be found at medium
or low levels of trade costs.
6.2 Complete contracts
To understand the role of contractual incompleteness, it is useful to compare the
previous results with the equilibrium outcome under complete contracts. When
complete contracts are feasible, the Y -ﬁrm and its local supplier set I and x as
to maximize the joint surplus from the outsourcing agreement, SO, and agree




AxI − x − I2 (38)










The corresponding price can be obtained by substituting (39) into the inverse
demand function p =( A/y)
1





Substituting (39) and (40) in (38) gives the maximized joint surplus SS =
A2/64. Thus, under complete contracts, the payoﬀ from outsourcing accruing
to the Y -ﬁrm is not ΠO but rather:






Diﬀerently from (26), for given A, (42) is a decreasing function of β.T h e
larger the MNE’s share of surplus, the higher its proﬁts from outsourcing. The
reason is that, in the absence of hold-up problems, the MNE’s investment, the
supplier’s output, and therefore the ﬁnal revenues are independent from the
division between parties. Accordingly, the parameter β acts as a sort of frictional
cost on the MNE’s revenues.
As in the case of incomplete contracts, two cases arise depending on the
relative value of β and τ.I f β > (1 − τ2) then ΠE > ΠS so that FDI plus
16outsourcing is dominated by FDI under intermediate exports. In this case, n =0
for all parameter values. Accordingly the features of the outsourcing contract
are immaterial and the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms between modes E and
X is clearly the same as in Case 1 under incomplete contracts:
Proposition 3 When β > (1 − τ2) FDI plus outsourcing (mode O)i sn e v e r
chosen. The choice between ﬁnal exports (mode X)a n dF D Ip l u si n t e r m e d i a t e
exports (mode E)i su n a ﬀected by trade costs and depends only on market size.
In particular, the share of ﬁrms choosing FDI increases with market size.
Things turn out to be diﬀerent if β < (1 − τ2).I n t h i s c a s e , ΠE < ΠS so
that m =0f o ra l lp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s . T h e n(m,n)=( 0 ,n ∗
S) is an equilibrium
distribution of ﬁrms between modes X and O whenever no ﬁrm wants to change
its mode. This happens for interior outcomes n ∈ (0,1) whenever:
∆X,S(n) ≡ ΠX − ΠS =
1
4






and for corner outcomes n =1(n =0 ) whenever ∆X,S(n) < 0 (> 0). In (43)
the market potential measure is obtained by solving (3) after substituting for
the equilibrium prices (6) for pX and (41) for pO:
AS(0,n)=
−4τ (1 − n)+4
q










(1 − β)L − 8τ2
τ2 (1 + β)
(45)
which can be shown to be a stable equilibrium since ∂∆X,S/∂n|n=n∗
S > 0.A s
under contractual incompleteness, with complete contracts the share of MNEs













Corner outcomes n =0and n =1are attained for LS
X ≥ L and L ≥ LS
O
respectively. Unlike under incomplete contracts, these two thresholds are both
increasing functions of τ. Moreover, by simple inspection of (45), the share of
ﬁrms choosing mode O under contractual completeness always rises with market
size and trade costs.
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 4 When β < (1−τ2) FDI plus intermediate exports (mode E)i s
never chosen. The choice between ﬁnal exports (mode X)a n dF D Ip l u so u s o u r c -
ing (mode O)i sa ﬀected by both market size and trade costs. In particular, the
share of ﬁrms choosing FDI increases with market size and trade costs.
17This proves that, as claimed above, the non-monotonicity described in Propo-
sition 2 is entirely due to contractual incompleteness. Note also the opposite
role of parameter β. Under complete contracts, for mode O to arise as an equi-
librium conﬁguration, both β and τ have to be small (speciﬁcally, β < (1−τ2)).
Intuitively, as already pointed out, the joint surplus from outsourcing is inde-
pendent from β. For small values of τ the exporting modes are expensive, and
for small values of β the Y -ﬁrm’s share of surplus and therefore its payoﬀ from
outsourcing are large. Under incomplete contracts, if mode O arises, τ has still
to be small but β has to be large (precisely, β > τ/2). This is due to the fact
that the joint surplus from outsourcing depends on the ex-post bargaining pow-
ers of the two parties. In particular, it drops to zero as β goes to zero. The
reason is that, under incomplete contracts, if its ex-post bargaining power is
negligible, the supplier does not produce any amount of intermediate for fear of
being held up.
These results are summarized in Figure 3, which shows that for large trade
costs (small τ) and small MNE’s shares of surplus from outsourcing (large β), Y -
ﬁrms choose between ﬁnal exports and FDI plus intermediate exports favoring
the former over the latter when market size is small. For small trade costs
(large τ) and large MNE’s shares of surplus from outsourcing (small β), Y -ﬁrms
choose between ﬁnal exports and FDI plus intermediate exports favoring the
former over the latter when market size is small. Lower trade costs promote
t h ec h o i c eo fX over O, while trade cost changes have no impact on the choice
between X and E.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 points out that contractual incompleteness al-
ters someway dramatically the choice of supply mode made when contract are
complete. In particular, the trade-oﬀ between modes E and O is completely
reversed. Indeed, for low trade costs, all the rest given, MNEs may shift from
intermediate exports for local assembly to local outsourcing due to improve-
ments in the writing and enforceability of outsourcing contracts.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have introduced contractual incompleteness in an otherwise standard model
of MNEs based on the trade-oﬀ between proximity and concentration. This has
been shown to alter the results of the original set-up from both a positive and
a normative points of view.
In terms of positive implications, we have shown that, for large markets,
incomplete outsourcing contracts can account for the emergence of FDIs not
only when trade costs are large (as predicted by the proximity-vs-concentration
set-up) but also when trade costs are small (as pointed out by empirical ob-
servation). The reason is the positive eﬀect that lower trade costs have on the
ex-post bargaining position of MNEs with resect to local subcontractors.
In terms of normative implications, weh a v es h o w nt h a tc o n t r a c t u a li n c o m -
pleteness alters someway dramatically the choice of supply mode made when
contracts are complete. In particular, for low trade costs, all the rest given,
18MNEs may shift from intermediate exports plus local assembly to intermediate
outsourcing due to improvements in the writing and enforceability of outsourc-
ing contracts.
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Figure 3 - Exports and FDI under complete contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 